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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past several years, the relationship between the federal 
and state governments has changed, at least in part, because the 
U.S. Supreme Court has begun to take federalism concerns quite se-
riously and has treated the Eleventh Amendment1 as offering much 
more protection to the states than it ever before had been thought to 
offer. One of the most interesting facets of the Court’s recent discov-
ery of the breadth and depth of the Eleventh Amendment lies in the 
explanation offered for that interpretation, which cannot be 
grounded in its text, original intent, or even good public policy, but 
nonetheless has gained the allegiance of a majority of the Court.2  
 Alden v. Maine3 is a good example both of the Court’s new-found 
jurisprudential method and of the seemingly unbridgeable chasm be-
tween the majority and minority positions on federalism issues. The 
Alden majority misconstrued history to contradict the Framers’ 
stated intentions and to provide an understanding of the constitu-
tional structure that the Framers almost certainly would have re-
jected. The Alden minority, while more plausibly characterizing the 
                                                                                                                  
 * Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A., Harvard College; M.A., 
Ph.D., University of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Professor 
Susan Gilles for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 3. Id. 
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historical views of the Framers, nonetheless failed to establish why 
those same Framers relied on by the majority would have rejected 
the majority’s position. This Article shows why Madison, Marshall, 
and Hamilton all would have rejected the Court’s current Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence and why the arguments offered in Alden 
are at best unpersuasive. 
 Part II of this Article discusses Chisholm v. Georgia,4 suggesting 
that the decision’s content and mode of analysis undercut the Alden 
Court’s characterization of it. Part III discusses the different inter-
pretations of the Eleventh Amendment, suggesting that the Court’s 
interpretation is one of the least plausible and ill-founded of those 
that have been offered. Part IV discusses the Framers’ intentions, 
suggesting that the Court’s current jurisprudence contradicts any 
plausible interpretation of either the Framers’ views or of the argu-
ments they made to convince others to ratify the Constitution. The 
Article concludes that the current Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence articulated by the Court is more consonant with the status of 
the states under the Articles of Confederation than under the Consti-
tution and that the understanding of the relationship between the 
federal and state governments currently favored by the Court is pre-
cisely what the Framers were attempting to displace when arguing 
for the ratification of the Constitution. 
II.   THE CHISHOLM  DECISION 
 The current federalism controversy dividing the Court can best 
be understood after a discussion of Chisholm and the nation’s reac-
tion to that decision. Chisholm’s holding, that states were subject to 
suits by citizens of other states, 5 was so unpopular6 that it was 
quickly overruled7 by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitu-
                                                                                                                  
 4. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 5. The opinions of the Justices, in a four-to-one decision, were rendered seriatim. See 
id. at 429. Chief Justice Jay held with the majority, see id. at 476, 479, as did Justice Blair, 
see id. at 451, Justice Wilson, see id. at 463, and Justice Cushing, see id. at 469. Justice Ire-
dell was the sole dissenter. See id. at 430.  
 6. See e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 326 (1969) (discuss-
ing “the passions aroused by the Chisholm decision”); James E. Pfander, History and State 
Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 
1269, 1278 (1998) (“The Chisholm decision does appear to have fallen upon the country 
with a profound shock . . . .”). But see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to 
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM . L. REV. 1413, 1440 (1975) (“[A]t least some Federal-
ists reacted positively to Chisholm immediately following the decision . . . .”). 
 7. Chisholm was decided in 1793, see Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 429, and the Eleventh 
Amendment was proposed to the state legislatures by the Third Congress on September 5, 
1794. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lvi (5th ed. 1997). In a 
message from the President to Congress on January 8, 1798, it was declared to have been 
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. See id.  
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tion.8 Courts and commentators disagree about whether9 and why10 
Chisholm was wrongly decided and even about the content of the 
Chisholm dissent. 11 An examination of the different issues discussed 
in Chisholm will help illustrate why the Court’s current federalism 
position neither captures the historical views of the Constitution’s 
Framers nor promotes the interests of the nation as a whole. 
A.   Doing Justice 
 In Chisholm, the state of Georgia was sued by a citizen of South 
Carolina.12 The state refused to appear in court, contending that it 
could not be sued by the plaintiff because it had sovereign immu-
nity.13 The Court disagreed,14 pointing to the specific provisions in the 
                                                                                                                  
 8. See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1983) (“The Amend-
ment’s language overruled the particular result in Chisholm.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 
410, 431 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the “prompt passage of the Eleventh 
Amendment nullifying the decision in [Chisholm v. Georgia]”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 45 
(1988) (“Chisholm v. Georgia . . . provoked enactment of the amendment . . . .”); James E. 
Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 555, 651 (1994) (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh Amendment 
was passed in response to Chisholm.”); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amend-
ment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1696 (1997) (“Most scholars agree . . . that the 
Amendment’s purpose was to reverse Chisholm.”). 
 9. See e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (“It might be argued that the 
Chisholm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional design and that the 
Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from the original understanding. This, how-
ever, seems unsupportable.”). But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“I am of opinion that the decision in [Chisholm] was based upon a sound in-
terpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was.”). 
 10. See e.g., William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling 
Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 931, 936 (1989/1990). Burnham states: 
According to the common law immunity theorists, the sin of the Chisholm ma-
jority was that it incorrectly mixed two questions: (1) whether the Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case under article III and its implementing 
statutes, and (2) whether an assumpsit cause of action for the state’s breach of 
contract existed in the face of Georgia’s defense of sovereign immunity. 
Id.; Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696 (“[S]cholars stress that Chisholm was an action in as-
sumpsit involving an ordinary commercial dispute between an individual and a state. They 
argue that the Eleventh Amendment merely reversed the Chisholm Court’s holding that 
the states could be sued in federal court by individuals on nonfederal causes of action.”). 
 11. Compare, for example, Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (suggesting that the dissent argued 
that a sovereign state could not be sued without its consent) with Alden, 527 U.S. at 787 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the core of the dissent as that “the Court could not as-
sume a waiver of the State’s common-law sovereign immunity where Congress had not ex-
pressly passed such a waiver”). 
 12. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420 (reporting the U.S. Attorney General’s motion on be-
half of Georgia, which described the parties); see also Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways 
and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987) (“Chisholm was an original action in assump-
sit, filed by the South Carolina executor of a South Carolina estate, to recover money owed 
to the estate by Georgia.”). 
 13. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (Jay, C.J.) (“It is said, that Georgia refuses to appear 
and answer to the Plaintiff in this action, because she is a sovereign State, and therefore 
not liable to such actions.”). 
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Constitution specifying that the Court would have jurisdiction in 
cases involving states as parties, 15 and holding that if the state re-
fused to appear in court before the beginning of the next term either 
to present its case or to establish why it did not need to do so, it 
would be subject to a default judgment.16 
 Chisholm implicated a number of different issues: whether states 
could ever be sued without their consent17 and, if so, under what con-
ditions; 18 whether, and to what extent, states had surrendered their 
sovereign immunity when becoming part of the Union;19 and, among 
other issues, what kind of sovereign immunity, if any, was enjoyed by 
the states once they became part of the Union.20 Chisholm did not 
answer these questions directly, although the different positions ar-
ticulated by the Justices made clear that sovereign immunity was 
not the bulwark against suits that some had believed. 
 Chisholm was a case in assumpsit21 in which the plaintiff was su-
ing the state of Georgia for money damages,22 and one issue was 
whether states were subject to those kinds of suits in particular.23 
                                                                                                                  
 14. See id. at 480 (Jay, C.J.) (“Ordered, that unless the said State shall either in due 
form appear, or show cause to the contrary in this Court, by the first day of next Term, 
judgment by default shall be entered against the said State.”); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974) (noting that the Chisholm decision allowed a state to be sued by a 
citizen of another state). 
 15. See id. 450 (Blair, J.) (“What then do we find there [in the Constitution] requiring 
the submission of individual States to the judicial authority of the United States? This is 
expressly extended, among other things, to controversies between a State and citizens of 
another State.”). 
 16. See id. at 480 (Jay, C.J.); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 17. See id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (implying that it was important to focus on 
the “particular question (abstracted from the general one, viz. Whether, a State can in any 
instance be sued?)”). 
 18. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “in England, certain judicial 
proceedings, not inconsistent with the sovereignty, may take place against the Crown, but 
that an action of assumpsit will not lie”). 
 19. See id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“Every State in the Union, in every instance 
where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as com-
pletely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.”); id. at 
457 (Wilson, J.) (“As to the purposes of the Union , therefore, Georgia is not a sovereign 
State. If the judicial decision of this case forms one of those purposes; the allegation, that 
Georgia is a sovereign State, is unsupported by the fact.”); id. at 468 (Cushing, J.) (“What-
ever power is deposited with the Union by the people, for their own necessary security, is 
so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of states.”). 
 20. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 540 (1977) (discussing whether the sovereign 
immunity enjoyed by the states is of common law versus constitutional dimension). 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1990) (“A common law form of action 
which lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple con-
tract; or a contract that is neither of record nor under seal.”). 
 22. See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696 (1997) (pointing out that some “scholars stress 
that Chisholm was an action in assumpsit involving an ordinary commercial dispute be-
tween an individual and a state”). 
 23. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469 (Jay, C.J.) (“A second question made in the 
case was, whether the particular action of assumpsit could lie against a State?”). 
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Justice Iredell pointed out in his Chisholm dissent that in “England, 
certain judicial proceedings not inconsistent with the sovereignty, 
may take place against the Crown, but . . . an action of assumpsit will 
not lie.”24 However, other members of the Court believed that an ac-
tion in assumpsit would be paradigmatic of the type of action that 
might be brought against a state by a citizen of another state. For 
example, Justice Cushing suggested that “assumpsit will lie, if any 
suit; provided a State is capable of contracting.”25 Thus, Alden claims 
to the contrary notwithstanding,26 the disagreement between the 
members of the Chisholm Court was not about whether a noncon-
senting state could ever be sued but instead about whether such a 
state could be subjected to an action in assumpsit. 27 
 Certainly, Justice Cushing’s position that an action in assumpsit 
must lie was not the only reasonable position that might have been 
offered. It could have been suggested that states would be subject to 
suit if, for example, a federal claim were at issue28 but not if a mere 
                                                                                                                  
 24. Id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting). But see id. at 458 (Wilson, J.) (suggesting that 
the British position “is only a branch of a much more extensive principle, on which a plan 
of systematic despotism has been lately formed in England, and prosecuted with unwea-
ried assiduity and care” and that the system in the United States is rather different). Jus-
tice Wilson stated that “all human law must be prescribed by a superior,” but he also 
stated:  
[A]nother principle, very different in its nature and operations forms . . . the 
basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of 
equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedi-
ence they require. The Sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in 
the man. 
Id. 
 25. Id. at 469 (Cushing, J.). 
 26. The Alden Court implied that Justice Iredell was claiming that states could not be 
sued without their consent. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[T]he doctrine 
that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when 
the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”). However, Justice Iredell was in fact suggest-
ing that because Congress had not authorized the Court to hear the suit in question, com-
mon law practices dictated whether the suit was permissible. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 435-
47 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussing various acts of Congress and relevant common law 
practices). Justice Iredell explained that the only remedy against one’s own sovereign at 
English common law was the petition of right: “[O]f whatever nature is the demand, . . . 
there must be some indorsement or order of the King himself to warrant any further pro-
ceedings. The remedy, . . . being a matter of grace, and not on compulsion.” Id. at 444 (Ire-
dell, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 27. See John V. Orth, The Truth about Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Geor-
gia (1793), Lecture delivered at North Carolina School of Law (Apr. 14, 1994), in 73 N.C. L. 
REV. 255, 263 (1994). Orth stated: 
With a care that could be mistaken for pedantry, Justice Iredell framed the 
question: ‘Will an action of assumpsit lie against a State?’—by which he meant 
literally to confine the case to the narrow question of whether a state could be 
sued in that particular form of action, not whether a state could be sued gener-
ally. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”). 
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contract claim were involved.29 However, rejecting that states would 
be liable for breach of contract claims30 would have some unwelcome 
implications, since a state might then enter into a contract, refuse to 
pay what was owed, and the other contracting party would have to 
bear the loss because no court could hear the cause of action.31 In the 
words of Chief Justice Jay, “The exception contended for, would con-
tradict and do violence to the great and leading principles of a free 
and equal national government, one of the great objects of which is, 
to ensure justice to all . . . .”32 
 Justice Wilson argued that states, like ordinary citizens, should 
not be permitted to avoid responsibility for their actions. He sug-
gested that a dishonest merchant who had made and willfully re-
fused to discharge a contract would be “amenable to a Court of Jus-
tice.”33 He then asked rhetorically whether a state that had made and 
willfully refused to discharge a contract should, “when summoned to 
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to 
assume a new appearance, and to insult . . . justice, by declaring I am 
a SOVEREIGN State?”34 Thus, because an individual could not make 
a contract, willfully refuse to discharge it, and nonetheless be im-
mune from liability, a state should not be able to do so either. 
 Arguably, one of the purposes of the Constitution is “to establish 
justice,”35 and it would be unjust to permit states to refuse to honor 
their agreements. Suppose, however, that a state had a good reason 
to justify its refusal to pay and was acting justly in so refusing. Even 
so, the reason for refusal would go to the merits of the case and 
should not preclude the Court from hearing argument. 
 Two additional points should be made about Justice Wilson’s ar-
gument. First, although he was suggesting that the Court had a duty 
to see that justice was done, he was not suggesting that the Court 
                                                                                                                  
 29. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 
77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1963) (discussing “Chisholm v. Georgia, where a state sought 
perhaps to avoid its contract, [or] possibly to defy the contract clause, but not to defy the 
national government”); see also Jackson, supra note 8, at 45 (pointing out that Chisholm 
“was a state law claim, presenting no substantive federal issues”). 
 30. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law , 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141, 1192 (1988) (mentioning “the breach of contract action in Chisholm”). 
 31. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (“What good 
purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing 
the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no con-
trouling judiciary power?”). Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on 
Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1143 (2000) (“To put it 
less delicately, the Union was composed of would-be deadbeats who wished to maintain the 
option of defaulting on their debts.”). 
 32. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477 (Jay, C.J.). 
 33. Id. at 456 (Wilson, J.). 
 34. Id. (Wilson, J.). 
 35. Id. at 465 (Wilson, J.); U.S. CONST., Preamble (“We the People of the United 
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice . . . .”). 
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could hear any case in which a state failed to live up to its commit-
ments. He, like the other Justices, tied the Court’s basis for jurisdic-
tion to the fact that Chisholm involved a controversy between one 
state and the citizen of another.36 Had a Georgia citizen brought the 
suit against his own state in Chisholm, the Court would not have had 
jurisdiction even if the alleged injustice had been no less significant. 37 
Second, while Justice Wilson’s analysis is not without merit, it may 
be less persuasive than it first appears. Arguably, even assuming 
that no there were no extenuating circumstances justifying a mer-
chant’s or a state’s refusal to pay, the cases would nonetheless be 
dissimilar in one important respect. Justice Iredell suggested that 
the cases were not comparable, precisely because of the different un-
derstandings regarding recourse for nonpayment that would have ex-
isted at the time the original agreements would have been made.38 
He pointed out that everyone “must know that no suit can lie against 
a Legislative body.”39 Anyone contracting with the state must hope 
that the “Legislature on principles of public duty, will make a provi-
sion for the execution of their own contracts . . . .”40 If the legislature 
does not, however, “the case is certainly without remedy in any of the 
Courts of the State.”41 Thus, Justice Iredell suggested, the would-be 
creditor would know prospectively that there would be no other re-
course if the legislature could not be convinced to pay the debt. 
 Justice Iredell was not suggesting that the legislature would be 
blameless for failing to fulfill the contract, since he discussed the “re-
proach the Legislature may incur.”42 However, he was suggesting 
that the courts could provide no remedy and, further, that everyone 
would be aware that no such recourse would be available when they 
had originally contracted with the state. Thus, the cases are readily 
distinguishable because prospectively there would be no expectation 
that a state could be brought to court for having failed to pay a debt, 
but there would be such an expectation regarding a merchant who 
had failed to do so. The cases differ not in whether the creditor 
                                                                                                                  
 36. See infra notes 67 and 70 and accompanying text. 
 37.  The Justices never stated as much outright. Instead, they discussed the Court’s 
jurisdiction relative to suits by a citizen against another state, a state against another 
state, foreign states against a state, and suits where the United States would be a party. 
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution established federal jurisdiction over all of these, 
but did not provide for suits by a citizen against his own state. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, 
cl. 1. Thus, because there would be neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal question juris-
diction, the Court could not have heard such a case. See, e.g., Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 
608, 618 (1893) (“The jurisdiction of the Federal courts is a limited one, depending upon ei-
ther the existence of a Federal question or diverse citizenship of the parties.”). 
 38. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 445 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 446. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id.  
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should be paid, or even in whether it would be unjust not to make the 
payment, but in the avenues that might be pursued in the event of 
nonpayment. 
B.   Becoming Part of the Union 
 Whether a state is subject to suit for an action in assumpsit de-
pends, at least in part, upon whether states should be characterized 
as sovereigns in their own right or whether, instead, they are more 
akin to other non-natural persons like corporations, which would be 
subject to such a suit. 43 Which characterization is proper depends 
upon what the states gave up to become part of the United States, for 
example, whether by entering the Union, Georgia implicitly or explic-
itly agreed to be subject to such suits. 44 
 Justice Iredell did not address what the states had implicitly sur-
rendered by becoming members of the United States. Instead, he fo-
cused on the conditions under which the Supreme Court would have 
jurisdiction to hear the case before it. He reasoned that if the Court 
could hear such an action against a state, “it must be in virtue of the 
Constitution of the United States, and of some law of Congress con-
formable thereto.”45 He thus suggested that a two-part inquiry would 
be necessary to determine whether the Court would have jurisdiction 
to hear such a case: (1) whether the Constitution even permitted 
nonconsented-to suits against states for money damages, and (2) 
whether, even if constitutionally permitted, Congress had in addition 
granted the Court jurisdiction over such a suit. While suggesting 
that the answer to (1) was “[n]o,”46 Justice Iredell made clear that his 
                                                                                                                  
 43. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (pointing out that sovereign 
immunity does not extend to municipal corporations). But cf. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 
448 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between states and corporations). 
 44. Justice Iredell stated that “[e]very State in the Union in every instance where its 
sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as completely so v-
ereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.” Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Blair’s approach differed slightly:  
The Constitution of the United States is the only fountain from which I shall 
draw; the only authority to which I shall appeal. Whatever be the true lan-
guage of that, it is obligatory upon every member of the Union; for, no State 
could have become a member, but by an adoption of it by the people of that 
State. 
Id. at 450. Chief Justice Jay made clear that the relevant issue was “whether Georgia has 
not, by being a party to the national compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens 
of another State.” Id. at 473. 
 45. Id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 46. See id. at 449 (“So much, however, has been said on the constitution, that it may 
not be improper to intimate, that my present opinion is strongly against any construction 
of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a state for the 
recovery of money.”). Justice Blair did not agree: 
It is, however, a sufficient answer to say, that our constitution most certainly 
contemplates, in another branch of the cases enumerated, the maintaining a 
jurisdiction against a state, as defendant; this is unequivocally asserted when 
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dissent was not predicated on that position,47 but on Congress’s not 
having authorized the Court to hear such a suit.48 
 The Constitution specifies that the “Judicial Power shall extend to 
. . . Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another 
State,”49 and, at least arguably, permits such suits.50 However, Jus-
tice Iredell argued that the Court’s jurisdiction was subject to the 
dictates of Congress51 and that the necessary congressional authori-
zation was lacking.52 Not only had Congress not specifically author-
ized the Court to hear suits against the states for money damages, 
but it had specified that the Court was limited in that the exercise of 
its jurisdiction must be “agreeable to the principles and usages of 
law.”53 
 Justice Iredell pointed out that no state had a law “authorizing a 
compulsory suit for the recovery of money against a State . . . either 
when the Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act 
was passed.”54 Thus, because the Court’s jurisdiction was based on 
whatever was agreeable to the principles and usages of law, and be-
cause no state had yet passed the relevant legislation at the time the 
Judiciary Act of 178955 was passed, Justice Iredell argued that the 
Court’s jurisdiction could not be grounded in the principles and us-
ages of law as reflected in the then-existing statutes. He referred to 
the laws of the time, not to establish that the state would have sover-
eign immunity even if Congress had specifically granted the Court 
                                                                                                                  
the judicial power of the United States is extended to controversies between 
two or more States . . . . 
Id. at 451 (Blair, J.). 
 47. See id. at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“This opinion I hold, however, with all the 
reserve proper for one, which, according to my sentiments in this case, may be deemed in 
some measure extra-judicial.”); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“Justice Iredell added, in what he clearly identified as dictum, that he was ‘strongly 
against’ any construction of the Constitution ‘which will admit, under any circumstances, a 
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money’ . . . .”). 
 48. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text. 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 50. See Chisholm, 2 U.S.(2 Dall.) at 450 (Blair, J.) (noting that the Constitution ex-
pressly includes controversies between a state and citizens of another state within the 
Court’s jurisdiction). 
 51. See id. at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I conceive, that all the Courts of the United 
States must receive, not merely their organization as to the number of Judges of which 
they are to consist; but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the 
Legislature only.”). 
 52. See New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. 284, 289 (1831) (“Mr. Justice Iredell thought 
an act of congress necessary to enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction.”).  
Justice Iredell was the only Member of the Court to hold that the suit could not 
lie; but if his discussion was far-reaching, his reasoning was cautious. Its core 
was that the Court could not assume a waiver of the State’s commonlaw sover-
eign immunity where Congress had not expressly passed such a waiver. 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 53. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 55. 1 STAT. 73. 
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jurisdiction over the action at issue (as one might have inferred from 
reading the Alden  interpretation of Justice Iredell’s dissent),56 but as 
a kind of default reference precisely because Congress had not spe-
cifically authorized the Court to hear a suit like the one at issue in 
Chisholm.57  
 Even if not reflected in existing statutory law, however, the prin-
ciples and usages of the common law might be thought to have pro-
vided the basis for the Chisholm Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. 
To determine whether that was so, it was necessary to examine 
whether, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, “an action . . . like 
this before the Court could have been maintained against one of the 
States in the Union upon the principles of the common law . . . .”58 
Justice Iredell concluded that such a case could not have been main-
tained at common law prior to the Constitution’s adoption and thus 
could not be maintained even after its adoption, precisely because 
there had been no congressional or statutory authorization that 
would have superseded the common law.59 
 When stating that the Court could only exercise jurisdiction if do-
ing so would be in accord with the principles and usages of law, Con-
gress might have meant that the principles and usages of law at the 
time the Judiciary Act was passed would be the relevant criterion,60 
or that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would have to be in accord 
with the principles and usages of law at the time the jurisdiction was 
challenged.61 That difference could be important, since the principles 
and usages might have changed in the intervening years. For exam-
ple, between the time that the Judiciary Act was passed and the time 
that Chisholm was decided, an act had been passed in Georgia that 
would have allowed suits against the state.62 A separate issue is 
whether a change in state law should have any import for whether 
                                                                                                                  
 56. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715. 
 57. Or, precisely because Congress had specifically authorized the Court to hear the 
action, if doing so was in accord with the existing practices and usages of law. 
 58. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also Jaffe, supra note 29, at 20 
(“Justice Iredell, dissenting, argued that in exercising its jurisdiction under the Constitu-
tion, the Court must look to the common law . . . .”). 
 59. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
 60. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 190 (1867) (“Usages of law . . . 
are the words of the provision, which, doubtless, refers to the principles and usages of law 
as known and understood in the State courts at the date of that enactment.”). 
 61. But see id. at 191, where the Court in Riggs stated:  
Adopted as [writs, executions, and the modes of process] were, by an act of 
Congress, they became the permanent forms and modes of proceeding, and con-
tinue in force wholly unaffected by any subsequent State legislation. Altera-
tions can only be made by Congress, or by the Federal courts, acting under the 
authority of an act of Congress. 
 62. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“Since that time an 
act of Assembly for such a purpose has been passed in Georgia. But that surely could have 
no influence in the construction of an act of the Legislature of the United States passed be-
fore [it].”). 
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federal jurisdiction can be asserted.63 However, this issue was not 
addressed by the Chisholm Court. Indeed, the majority and dissent 
addressed very different issues. 
 Justice Iredell framed the issues narrowly—had Congress author-
ized the Court to hear an action in assumpsit?—to provide a way for 
the Court to avoid what would likely be a very unpopular decision.64 
The other Justices did not address whether the principles and usages 
of law were fixed at the time the Judiciary Act was adopted or in-
stead should be thought to evolve through time. Rather, they focused 
on the language in the Constitution specifying the Court’s jurisdic-
tion. For example, Justice Blair pointed out that the Constitution 
“gives to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction, among other in-
stances, in the case where a State shall be a party,”65 and then asked 
rhetorically: “[B]ut is not a State a party as well in the condition of a 
Defendant, as in that of a Plaintiff?”66 
 Each of the Justices in the majority framed the issue as whether 
the state had general immunity from suit as a defendant,67 although 
Chief Justice Jay’s analysis of sovereign immunity had an additional 
component. First, he addressed “whether suability is compatible with 
State sovereignty”68 as a general matter. Like the other Justices, he 
pointed out that “any one State in the Union may sue another State, 
in this Court,”69 and then concluded that “suability and state sover-
eignty are not incompatible.”70 
                                                                                                                  
 63. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“But [the passing of the act] surely could have no 
influence in the construction of an act of the Legislature of the United States passed be-
fore.”). For a similar view, see Riggs, 73 U.S. at 191 (discussing the irrelevance of subse-
quent state action to whether federal courts would have jurisdiction). 
 64. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999). (“[E]ven a casual reading of the 
opinions suggests the majority suspected the decision would be unpopular and surpris-
ing.”); see also Orth, supra note 27, at 267 (noting “th e risks the Court ran by deciding 
against Georgia (or any other recalcitrant state)”). 
 65. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (Blair, J.); see also Pfander, supra note 8, at 588 
(suggesting that the “grant of Supreme Court original jurisdiction effectuates . . . a waiver 
[of immunity by the states]”). 
 66. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (Blair, J.). 
 67. Justice Blair pointed out that the Constitution “contemplates . . . the maintaining 
a jurisdiction against a state, as defendant; this is unequivocally asserted, when the judi-
cial power of the United States is extended to controversies between two or more states.” 
Id. at 451 (Blair, J.). Justice Wilson asked rhetorically whether the “most consummate de-
gree of professional ingenuity [could] devise a mode by which this ‘controversy between two 
States’ [could] be brought before a court of law; and yet neither of those states be a defen-
dant.” Id. at 466 (Wilson, J.). Justice Cushing rejected the suggestion that the Constitution 
“could not be intended to subject a state to be a defendant, because it would effect the so v-
ereignty of states,” by pointing out that in “‘controversies between two or more States,’ . . . 
a state must of necessity be defendant.” Id. at 467 (Cushing, J.). 
 68. Id. at 472 (Jay, C.J.). 
 69. Id. at 473. 
 70. Id. The Cohens Court suggested that the amendment was not designed “to main-
tain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory ap-
pearance before the tribunal of the nation,” since the amendment “does not comprehend 
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 Chief Justice Jay understood that even if states are suable by 
other states, it might nonetheless be argued that “the State is not 
bound to appear and answer as a Defendant, at the suit of an indi-
vidual.”71 However, he pointed out: “That rule is said to be a bad one, 
which does not work both ways; the citizens of Georgia are content 
with a right of suing citizens of other States; but are not content that 
citizens of other States should have a right to sue them.”72 This latter 
argument—that fairness requires that those capable of suing should 
be subject to suit, and vice versa, was addressed and implicitly sup-
ported by John Marshall in the Virginia debates concerning whether 
the Constitution should be ratified.73 When holding that sovereignty 
was compatible with being sued by individuals, the Chisholm Court 
did not distinguish between federal and nonfederal causes of action—
it suggested that a citizen of another state might bring either kind of 
action. Arguably, that was a mistake,74 and the failure to so distin-
guish caused the Court to misrepresent (at least some of) the Fram-
ers’ intentions. 75 
 The issue before the Chisholm Court was whether the Court had 
jurisdiction to hear an action in assumpsit. A separate issue involved 
whether the debt was enforceable even if it had been contracted be-
fore the Constitution had been ratified. Even if a state were suable 
for debts contracted after it had become part of the United States, 
                                                                                                                  
controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State.” Cohens 
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). 
 71. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 473 (Jay, C.J.). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See infra notes 217-230 and accompanying text. The only way to make sense of 
Marshall’s comments is to ascribe this view to him, although the transcribed comments do 
not say this literally. The point here is not that fairness is the only, or even the weightiest, 
consideration when assessing whether states should have sovereign immunity in these 
matters, but merely that this at the very least, is an argument that Marshall thought suf-
ficiently compelling that it needed to be addressed. 
 74. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 599 (suggesting, contrary to the majority in Chis-
holm, that states’ immunity was waived on federal questions but that the states’ common 
law immunity had to be respected on nonfederal questions); see also Martha A. Field, The 
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition 
of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1210 (1978) (arguing for federal question 
jurisdiction: “There is no place for a sovereign immunity claim in a suit by a state’s own 
citizens when Congress, acting within its regulatory powers, has authorized the suit; by 
ratifying the Constitution, with its grants of power to Congress, the state consented to 
such suits.”). William Burnham made a similar argument: 
The Chisholm Court should have separated the issues and decided that it had 
jurisdiction under article III, but that such a grant of jurisdiction did nothing to 
affect the law to be applied in the case. The substantive law, which governed 
both the plaintiff’s claim and Georgia’s defense, was the general common law, 
which provided that an assumpsit claim would not lie against a state in the ab-
sence of its consent to suit. 
Burnham, supra note 10, at 936. 
 75. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 561 (suggesting that the Framers’ intent was that 
they would lose their immunity with respect to federal causes of action but not for nonfed-
eral causes of action). 
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that would not mean that it would also be suable for debts acquired 
before becoming part of the Union. Chief Justice Jay made quite 
clear that the Chisholm Court was not deciding whether, for exam-
ple, an individual could “sue a State on bills of credit issued before 
the Constitution was established, and which were issued and re-
ceived on the faith of the State, and at a time when no ideas or ex-
pectations of judicial interposition were entertained or contem-
plated.”76 Nonetheless, the very possibility that states would be re-
sponsible for such debts provided great impetus to amend the Consti-
tution to overrule Chisholm. 
III.   THE PASSAGE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
 Courts and commentators agree that the Eleventh Amendment 
was designed to overrule Chisholm and that a major impetus for its 
passage was that judicial enforcement of debts acquired prior to and 
during the war would impose potentially crushing burdens on the 
states. 77 However, there is agreement about little else, except per-
haps that current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is something 
of a “doctrinal mess,”78 and the unresolved issues are not only divid-
ing the Court, but have significant implications for what kind of 
country the United States is and will become. 
A.   The Eleventh Amendment 
 The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”79 The language of the Amendment seems rather straightfor-
ward and to require relatively little interpretation.80 Appearances 
notwithstanding, however, it is not immediately clear how to con-
strue the Amendment, and current commentators not only engage in 
                                                                                                                  
 76. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 479 (Jay, C.J.). 
 77. See infra notes 99-124. 
 78. James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal 
Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
161, 167 (1998). 
 79. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 80. See Gene R. Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601, 609 
(1989). Shreve wrote: 
The manner in which the eleventh amendment deals with state immunity may 
be arbitrary, but the text is no less clear for that. It does not protect states from 
suit by their own citizens. It applies without reference to the remedy sought. It 
restricts all of the judicial power, not merely that exercised under diversity ju-
risdiction. 
Id. 
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extratextual analysis,81 but also seem to ignore or radically alter the 
text.82 
 There is general agreement that the Eleventh Amendment pre-
cludes a suit like Chisholm, although that might be for a number of 
different reasons. For example, the only reason that the Court had 
jurisdiction to hear Chisholm was because the Constitution says that 
the federal judicial power shall extend to controversies “between a 
State and Citizens of another State.”83 If the purpose of the Eleventh 
Amendment was merely to overrule Chisholm, then the Amendment 
(1) would make clear that Chisholm was wrongly decided or, at any 
rate, that the Constitution would no longer permit suits like Chis-
holm to be heard in federal court, and (2) would not change anything 
else in the Constitution. As the Alden Court recognized, “[b]y its 
terms, . . . the Eleventh Amendment did not redefine the federal ju-
dicial power but instead overruled the Court,”84 and thus even the 
Alden Court should be sympathetic to the suggestion that Chisholm 
should be read narrowly. 
 Someone tempted to interpret the Eleventh Amendment as 
merely overturning Chisholm—as only precluding diversity jurisdic-
tion in federal court where a state is one of the parties85—might seem 
to have an insurmountable hurdle. The Eleventh Amendment ap-
pears not merely to preclude diversity jurisdiction where a state is a 
party, but it precludes any federal jurisdiction where a state is a 
party and a citizen or subject of a foreign state is the other party. 
Thus, the Amendment’s language suggests that no suit in law or eq-
uity may be brought by a foreign citizen,86 and the claim that the 
                                                                                                                  
 81. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1347 (1989) (discussing Professor William Marshall’s claim that di-
versity theorists must also engage in substantial extratextual analysis). 
 82. Cf. id. at 1345 (suggesting that it is “difficult to think of any other facet of the 
Constitution with respect to which the Court has reached results so obviously inconsistent 
with the words used by the framers”). The same might be said of the other interpretations. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In fact, all of the Justices in the Chisholm majority 
pointed to this provision to justify the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. See supra notes 
67-70 and accompanying text. 
 84. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999). 
 85. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM . L. REV. 1889, 1894 (1983) (“The amendment did nothing more 
than amend article III, section 2 of the Constitution to eliminate the power of federal 
courts to hear suits against states in which the sole basis for jurisdiction was the status of 
the parties.”); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Penn-
hurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 68 (1984) (suggesting “that the eleventh amendment is 
addressed only to the question of party identity as a basis of jurisdiction”); Vazquez, supra 
note 8, at 1697 (“[D]iversity scholars agree that the Amendment should not be understood 
to bar Congress from conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts over cases arising under 
federal law but should instead be read to preclude only federal jurisdiction over suits 
against states predicated solely on diversity.”). 
 86. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484-85 
(1987). The Court stated: 
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Amendment was merely restoring the common law immunity to the 
states would seem to be belied by the text. 87 An additional difficulty 
posed by the text is that it only addresses suits between states and 
foreign citizens. In other words, in reading the Amendment on its 
face, a state’s own citizens are not precluded from suing their state in 
federal court, even though the citizens of other states are so pre-
cluded.88 Some commentators have suggested that the Amendment 
makes no sense precisely because it has this seemingly irrational fea-
ture.89 
 In Blatchford v. Noatak,90 the Court suggested that it understands 
the “Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but 
for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it con-
firms: that the States entered the federal system with their sover-
eignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by 
this sovereignty.”91 The Alden Court spoke approvingly of the Blatch-
ford view92 and implied that the Blatchford understanding was re-
flected in the constitutional design.93 As the Alden Court explained, 
although the Court sometimes refers to the “State’s immunity from 
suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity,’ [t]he phrase is convenient 
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity 
of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the 
Eleventh Amendment.”94 Yet, if the Eleventh Amendment merely 
confirms the original constitutional structure, it will be important to 
understand the conditions under which state sovereign immunity 
could be asserted within the original constitutional design. Once that 
                                                                                                                  
 The dissent, observing that jurisdiction in Chisholm itself was based solely on 
the fact that Chisholm was not a citizen of Georgia, argues that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply to cases presenting a federal question. . . . Federal-
question actions unquestionably are suits “in law or equity”; thus the plain lan-
guage of the Amendment refutes this argument.  
Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 81, at 1347 (“[T]he diversity theory goes on completely to 
ignore the operative words of the amendment, which provide that ‘[t]he judicial power 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity’ that meets the criteria set 
forth in the amendment.”). 
 87. See Burnham, supra note 10, at 937 (“The eleventh amendment, then, by 
restoring article III to its proper position of neutrality with regard to the common law, had 
the effect of restoring to  the states the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity from 
suit.”). 
 88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
 89. See Allen K. Easley, The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Amendment: Mourning 
the Lost Opportunity to Synthesize Conflicting Precedents, 64 DENV. U. L. REV. 485, 487 
(1988) (suggesting that the Amendment “makes no sense”). 
 90. 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
 91. Id. at 779 (citing Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 
468, 472 (1987) (plurality opinion)). 
 92. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999). 
 93. See id. at 710-11 (“[A]s the Constitution’s structure . . . make[s] clear, the State’s 
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed 
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”). 
 94. Id. at 710. 
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is understood, Alden claims notwithstanding, it will be clearer why 
the Amendment should be interpreted narrowly and why it is best 
understood as merely precluding federal diversity jurisdiction when a 
state and a foreign citizen are the parties. 
B.   Why Only Preclude Citizens of Other States and Countries 
 from Suing? 
 When the Chisholm decision was issued, it was greeted with “pro-
found shock,”95 and the Eleventh Amendment was adopted soon 
thereafter.96 However, it is important to establish what caused the 
shock. It was not, for example, the idea that a state might be sued by 
a mere citizen, since states had already adopted their own laws per-
mitting such suits by the time Chisholm was issued97 and, in fact, as 
Justice Iredell pointed out in his Chisholm dissent, Georgia permit-
ted such suits. 98 Rather, it seems plausible to suggest that the shock 
resulted from a consideration of who would benefit if such suits were 
permitted—speculators99 who had bought state debts at a mere frac-
tion of their face value,100 Tories/British sympathizers,101 and the 
                                                                                                                  
 95. Pfander, supra note 8, at 578 (discussing “the ‘profound shock’ school of Eleventh 
Amendment thought”); see also Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 
U.S. 468, 484 (1987) (“The reaction to Chisholm was swift and hostile. The Eleventh 
Amendment passed both Houses of Congress by large majorities in 1794.”); Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (suggesting Chisholm “created such a shock of surprise through-
out the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment 
to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by 
the legislatures of the States.”); Jaffe, supra note 29, at 20 (“Chisholm v. Georgia in the 
words of Mr. Justice Bradley created ‘such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, 
at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution 
was almost unanimously proposed . . . .’”).  
 96. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 651 (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh 
Amendment was passed in response to Chisholm.”). 
 97. See id. at 580 (“Americans had substituted the sovereignty of the people for the 
sovereignty of the crown and had secured limitations on governmental power through 
adoption of written constitutions. Judge Gibbons notes that the charters of many American 
colonies included provisions that authorized suit against the governing body.”). 
 98. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1366 (“The class of out-of-state creditors appears 
predominantly to have been the speculators whom many states had a strong aversion to 
paying.”). 
 100. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 325 (“The citizenry was up in arms against taxation 
that would only serve to enrich Tories and speculators who had bought State obligations 
for a few cents on the dollar.”); CLYDE E. JACOBS,  THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 33 (1972) (discussing the fear that Virginia “could be sued in federal 
court by northern holders of depreciated currency, who had purchased the notes for a tiny 
fraction of their face value”); Pfander, supra note 6, at 1282-83 (“[A]grarians saw full re-
payment of public debts as likely to impose a stiff tax burden on the yeomanry, and to 
benefit the speculators and ‘bloodsuckers’ who had paid less than par for their public secu-
rities and who would reap profits from redemption at par.”). 
 101. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 326 (discussing “the bitter resentment against suits 
by speculators and Loyalists”); see also Nowak, supra note 6, at 1440 (explaining that Fed-
eralists voted for the Amendment to show that they were against “Tory suits”). Further, 
there might have been the separate worry that if Congress did not support an amendment, 
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British themselves.102 Thus, while at first blush it might seem 
unlikely that an amendment would be adopted solely to ensure that 
out-of-staters could not sue for debt collection,103 it becomes more un-
derstandable when one considers who in particular those individuals 
might be—either out-of-state speculators104 or those whose sympa-
thies lay with those against whom the Revolutionary War had re-
cently been fought. 
 John Gibbons points out that at the beginning of the Revolution-
ary War, “American debtors, mostly southern planters, owed about 
$28 million to British merchants,”105 and that none of that debt had 
been paid by the end of 1782.106 The Peace Treaty of 1783 signed with 
the British guaranteed both that debts would be paid in sterling, 
rather than in paper money, and that British and Loyalist property 
would receive increased protection.107 If these provisions could be en-
forced in federal court, many southerners stood to lose huge sums of 
money.108 As if this were not enough reason for southern planters to 
be upset about being forced to pay those against whom they had re-
cently been at war, there was further reason, since the evacuating 
British army had emancipated thousands of slaves, notwithstanding 
an explicit treaty provision that they would do no such thing.109 The 
southerners viewed themselves as doubly harmed by this British 
army action because they not only had lost their “property,” but in 
                                                                                                                  
states might have called for a constitutional convention. See Marshall, supra note 81, at 
1359 (“If Congress had not proposed an amendment to protect the states, the states might 
have tried to invoke the alternative method for securing constitutional change—calling a 
constitutional convention.”). 
 102. See JACOBS, supra note 100, at 70 (“[I]n Congress, as well as in the state legisla-
tures, there was strong opposition to recognition of any liability to reimburse British credi-
tors or to make restitution for the seizure of Loyalist property.”); Gibbons, supra note 85, at 
1900 (“At the outset of the war, American debtors, mostly southern planters, owed about 
$28 million to British merchants, an amount equal in value to two years’ worth of im-
ports.”). Further, the expectation that such suits would be brought was not unreasonable. 
See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1357 (“The fear that the decision in Chisholm would give 
rise to loyalists and British creditors bringing suits in federal court was far from specula-
tive.”). 
 103. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1357 (“Yet it is doubtful that the framers would have 
drafted an amendment to deal with so modest a threat to the state treasuries as that posed 
by out-of-state plaintiffs.”). 
 104. See JACOBS, supra note 100, at 24 (stating that the “holders of state obligations 
were concentrated in a few states”); Marshall, supra note 81, at 1365 (“[I]t appears that a 
large portion of the state debt was held by out-of-staters. Specifically, southern states’ debt 
was held by northern merchants.”); id. at 1366 (“The class of out-of-state creditors appears 
predominantly to have been the speculators whom many states had a strong aversion to 
paying. The class of in-state creditors, on the other hand, was a mixed bag and included 
many original holders of the debt.”). 
 105. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1900. 
 106. See id. at 1901. 
 107. See id. at 1900-01. 
 108. See id. at 1900 (suggesting that the debt amounted to about two and a half years 
worth of imports). 
 109. See id. at 1900-01. 
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addition, a source of inexpensive labor whereby they might have been 
able to earn money to pay their debts.110 
 When the ratification debates were taking place, it was widely 
known that not all of the Southern states were complying with the 
Peace Treaty with Great Britain.111 The issue of honoring that treaty 
was itself a burning issue during the ratification debates, 112 and rati-
fication of the Constitution (unless amended) might have required 
treaty compliance. For this reason, changes in the language of the 
Constitution were proposed; for example, there was a proposal that 
federal courts would have no jurisdiction over treaty-based causes of 
action that originated before the ratification of the Constitution.113 
 The failure of some states to honor the provisions of the treaty 
gave Great Britain an excuse not to honor some of its provisions, for 
example, to cease occupying forts that the British had promised to 
abandon.114 Without credible assurances that Southern states would 
honor the Treaty, the British had no incentive to fulfill their part of 
the bargain. Many believed that it was essential that the treaty pro-
visions be honored—indeed, John Gibbons discussed a “pervasive be-
lief that the fate of the nation . . . hinge[d] on its ability to enforce the 
1783 treaty.”115 Nonetheless, many southerners were not anxious to 
pay debts to the British, especially without receiving compensation 
for their losses. 116 
 Given the context in which the Eleventh Amendment was passed, 
it does not seem surprising that the Amendment does not preclude a 
citizen from suing her own state in federal court117 but only precludes 
citizens from other states or countries from doing so,118 commentators 
                                                                                                                  
 110. See id. at 1918 (discussing Jefferson’s claim that “by carrying off so many slaves, 
Great Britain had impoverished the planters and left them in no position to pay”). 
 111. See id. at 1906 (discussing the general knowledge of “Virginia’s ongoing violations 
of the peace treaty”). 
 112. See id. at 1907 (mentioning the “burning issue of the power of British creditors to 
redress their claims under the treaty in court”). 
 113. See id. at 1906 (discussing George Mason’s suggestion). 
 114. See id. at 1900. 
 115. Id. at 1902. 
 116. See id. at 1923.  
Justice Iredell . . . was more sensitive than any of his colleagues to the depth of 
southern antagonism aroused by the thought that debts dating from 1774 and 
earlier would have to be paid with interest, and land titles disturbed, while no 
one would be compensated for the loss of slaves carried off in 1783. 
Id. 
 117. The Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes citizens from suing 
their own states, although not because of anything in the text. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U.S. 651, 662-63 (1973) (“While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a 
State by its own citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is 
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of 
another State.”); see also Field, supra note 20 (discussing “the extension [of the Eleventh 
Amendment] to suits by a state’s own citizens”). 
 118. See William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1378 (1989) (“While the wording of the 
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claims to the contrary notwithstanding.119 A possible implication of 
Chisholm had been that foreign creditors would be able to sue in fed-
eral court to have their debts paid in sterling, but the Eleventh 
Amendment removed that possibility. 
 The Eleventh Amendment did not need to address the ability of 
in-staters to sue in federal court because there would have been no 
diversity jurisdiction to allow in-stater suits in federal court to force 
the states to pay their contract debts. Not only would in-staters have 
been less likely to have been speculators, but such citizens, if permit-
ted to sue at all, would have been suing in state court. Thus, al-
though the fact that the Constitution did not preclude in-staters from 
suing might have induced out-of-staters to sell the debts they owned 
to in-staters, 120 the in-staters would either have been precluded from 
suing because of common law sovereign immunity,121 or, in any event, 
would be suing in state court where the court would be more likely to 
uphold122 a state law requiring payment in paper money123 or in notes 
that were virtually worthless because of inflation.124 
 The Court explained in Cohens v. Virginia125 that “at the adoption 
of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the ap-
prehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal 
Courts, formed a very serious objection to [the Constitution].”126 
When the Chisholm Court held that it had jurisdiction over the case 
at issue, the “alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions 
that were so extensively entertained, [the Eleventh] amendment was 
proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures.”127 
 It may well be that states did not expect that those obligations in-
curred before becoming members of the United States would have to 
be met, especially not at face value or in sterling,128 and thus that 
                                                                                                                  
amendment purportedly prohibits all suits, including federal claims, brought against 
states by out-of-staters, it does not prohibit federal claims brought by in -staters.”). 
 119. See Easley, supra note 89, at 487-88. 
 120. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1358 (noting that “a constitutional amendment that 
barred disfavored plaintiffs from bringing federal claims but permitted eligible in-state 
plaintiffs to do so would have invited the sale of notes, indents, and certificates from (ineli-
gible) out-of-staters to (eligible) in-staters”). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Cf. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1922 (discussing a defense against foreign creditors 
that would likely be upheld by state courts). 
 123. See id. at 1901 (discussing paper-money legal tender laws). 
 124. See id. at 1911. 
 125. 19 U.S.(6 Wheat) 264 (1821). 
 126. Id. at 406. 
 127. Id.; see also, Jackson, supra note 8, at 23 (“Motivated by a fear that pre-existing 
debts would be enforced by out-of-state creditors, the amendment was, in Marshall’s view, 
narrowly drafted to extend only to those suits commenced by ‘persons who might probably 
be its creditors.’“) (quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 406). 
 128. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1278 (“Chisholm was shocking . . . less because it 
contemplated the suability of the states as corporate bodies than because it threatened to 
require the states to honor old obligations to individual suitors in specie.”); see also id. at 
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Chisholm was contrary to the expectations of the time. However, its 
being contrary to some expectations or understandings does not es-
tablish that it was incorrect and certainly does not establish that 
there was a general understanding that the states had constitutional 
immunity from suit. 
 The Alden Court considered and rejected the idea that “the Chis-
holm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional de-
sign and that the Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from 
the original understanding.”129 The Alden Court gave two reasons: (1) 
The Chisholm majority allegedly “failed to address either the prac-
tice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the time the 
Constitution was adopted,” and (2) the “majority suspected the deci-
sion would be unpopular and surprising.”130 Yet, as Justice Iredell 
made clear in his dissent, the first failing was significant only be-
cause Congress had not specifically granted the federal courts juris-
diction over cases like Chisholm,131 and the latter “failing” may speak 
as much to the Court’s willingness to make difficult decisions as to 
anything else.132 
 Even if Chisholm in fact “shocked the Nation,”133 it is important to 
know whether that shock was due to an undermining of existing no-
tions of sovereign immunity134 or, instead, to the expectation that 
out-of-state creditors would now unfairly benefit because, for exam-
ple, the debts incurred before states joined the Union were not even 
thought to be enforceable or because the speculators would receive 
exorbitant windfalls if paid in specie.135 One interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                  
1286-87 (describing various states that required creditors to accept paper money as legal 
tender). 
 129.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. 
 132. Cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 790 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a remarkable doctrine 
that would hold anticipation of unpopularity the benchmark of constitutional error.”). 
 133. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1973). 
 134. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 505 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The majority of the delegates who spoke at the Virginia Con-
vention, including Mason, Henry, Pendleton, and Randolph, did not believe that state sov-
ereign immunity provided protection against suits initiated by citizens of other States.”); 
Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1899 (“[E]vidence of a contemporaneous belief in state sovereign 
immunity from suit in the federal courts is extraordinarily weak.”). 
 135. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1310 (discussing the claim that “the new Article III 
courts would lack the power to enforce government obligations issued under the Articles of 
Confederation, because those obligations had been created without the expectation of legal 
enforceability”); see also JACOBS, supra note 100, at 36 (discussing an influential anti-
federalist tract written by Richard Henry Lee in which he noted that the states “had de-
faulted upon many promises made during the war, and they had not been subject to suit 
for such delinquencies. Such remedies were not contemplated by either the states or their 
creditors at the time the contracts were made.”). 
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Eleventh Amendment is that it simply reinstated the state of affairs 
where pre-War debts were once again unenforceable.136 
 An additional consideration militates in favor of a narrow inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment, insofar as one wishes to cap-
ture the understanding of those voting for it. The Amendment’s pas-
sage required Federalist support. While the Federalists may well 
have felt compelled to support the Amendment because of political 
pressures, 137 they nonetheless would likely have framed the Amend-
ment in the narrowest terms possible that would still withstand the 
political pressures of the time.138 
C.   Does the Amendment Preclude Federal Question Jurisdiction? 
 Suppose one accepts that the Framers of the Eleventh Amend-
ment were not making a mistake, but actually intended to withdraw 
federal court jurisdiction from cases involving states and foreign citi-
zens, and that the narrowest interpretation would capture the Fram-
ers’ intent, because the Amendment could not have passed without 
Federalist support. Still, even a narrow interpretation of the 
Amendment—“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State”139—suggests that 
federal courts are precluded from hearing all cases where a state and 
foreign citizen or subject are parties, even if a federal question is im-
plicated. 
 In Missouri v. Fiske,140 the Court pointed out that the “fact that 
the motive for the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment was to quiet 
grave apprehensions that were extensively entertained with respect 
to the prosecution of state debts in the federal courts cannot be re-
garded . . . as restricting the scope of the Amendment to suits to ob-
tain money judgments.”141 After all, the Court suggested, the “terms 
of the Amendment, notwithstanding the chief motive for its adoption, 
were not so limited.”142 However, requiring that one pay close atten-
                                                                                                                  
 136. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1343 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment “placed 
pre-constitutional debts beyond the reach of the federal courts”). 
 137. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text (suggesting that those who might 
benefit from Chisholm would have been very politically unpopular). 
 138. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1934 (“But the Federalists sought to draft the 
amendment in the narrowest possible form that would serve to quiet the rapidly mobilizing 
reaction to Chisholm, while leaving intact the rest of article III.”); see also Jackson, supra 
note 8, at 46 (“[T]he amendment was widely supported in Congress by federalists and non-
federalists alike, suggesting that Congress did not intend a broad change in the power of 
the national government.”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
 140. 290 U.S. 18 (1933). 
 141. Id. at 27. 
 142. Id. 
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tion to the text is double-edged, since that would mean that a citizen 
was not barred from suing her own state in federal court. In part be-
cause of this implication regarding whether citizens could sue their 
own states in federal court, 143 the Alden Court has suggested that it 
is not necessary to pay close attention to the Amendment’s wording. 
The Court stated that the “Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather 
than established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle,” 
and that the “scope of the States’ immunity from suit is demarcated 
not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postu-
lates implicit in the constitutional design.”144 
 The Alden Court’s explanation for why state sovereign immunity 
should exceed the limits imposed by the Eleventh Amendment is 
somewhat surprising. The Court suggested that “[g]iven the outraged 
reaction to Chisholm, as well as Congress’ repeated refusal to other-
wise qualify the text of the Amendment, it is doubtful that if Con-
gress meant to write a new immunity into the Constitution it would 
have limited that immunity to the narrow text of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”145 Yet, this argument runs counter to common experi-
ence, since it suggests that individuals in shock and rage understated 
the protections that they meant to enact. One would normally expect 
that anger would lead to an overstatement that would be toned down 
when calmer heads could prevail.146 
 Diversity theorists agree with the Court that Congress was not at-
tempting to write a new immunity into the Constitution; they claim 
that Congress was, instead, merely trying to prevent the federal 
court from having diversity jurisdiction over a state on a matter of 
state law.147 As a variety of theorists have remarked, the terms of the 
Amendment do not preclude citizens from suing their own states in 
federal court if a federal question is at issue and it would seem 
strange that in-state citizens would be allowed to do so and out-of-
state citizens would not,148 since the latter group would seem more 
                                                                                                                  
 143. See infra notes 148-152 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Eleventh 
Amendment precludes citizens from suing their own states in federal court). 
 144. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999). 
 145. Id. at 723. 
 146. The claim here is not that the Amendment should be interpreted in terms of how 
it would have been written had there been time for more deliberation, but that the literal 
language of the Amendment supports a diversity interpretation. See infra notes 170-174 
and accompanying text. 
 147. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1351 (“[T]he Amendment explains or clarifies that 
the nominally reciprocal terms of the Article III diversity grant were not to ‘be construed 
to’ extend to suits and proceedings in which a State was a party defendant. This account of 
theAmendment leaves other sources of jurisdiction over suits against the states intact and 
unaffected, including the provision for the exercise of jurisdiction over federal question 
claims against the states.”); see also infra note 161. 
 148. See Marshall, supra note 118, at 1378 (“[T]here is no persuasive reason why suits 
based upon federal law should be allowed in federal court when brought by an in-stater, 
but should not be allowed in federal court when brought by an out-of-stater.”). 
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likely to need the allegedly greater objectivity of the federal courts. 149 
Further, it is not plausible to explain the noninclusion of in-staters in 
the Eleventh Amendment as a mere oversight,150 since it is quite con-
ceivable that in-staters would need to bring an action for a violation 
arising under the Constitution or federal law.151 It is thus surprising 
that in-staters would not have been excluded if that had been the de-
sire.152 
 Justice Antonin Scalia has suggested that the wording of the 
Eleventh Amendment itself suggests that it was designed to remove 
diversity jurisdiction from the federal courts: 
[T]here is no plausible reason why one would wish to protect a 
State from being sued in federal court for violation of federal 
law . . . when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or country, 
but to permit a State to be sued there when the plaintiff is citizen 
of the State itself.153  
 Most commentators agree that it makes no sense to distinguish 
between in-staters and out-of-staters in this way; however, they dis-
agree about what conclusion should be drawn from that fact. Some 
argue that out-of-staters were only intended to be precluded from do-
ing what in-staters were precluded from doing,154 which is why out-
of-staters should not be precluded from filing in federal court if a fed-
eral question is at issue, whereas others suggest that this is why in-
staters should also be precluded from filing in federal court even if a 
federal question is at issue.155 
                                                                                                                  
 149. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 390 (1821) (“State tribunals might 
be suspected of partiality in cases between itself . . . and aliens, or the citizens of another 
State.”); see also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-18 (1858) (suggesting that 
“the local tribunals could hardly be e xpected to be always free from . . . local influences”). 
 150. See Marshall, supra note 118, at 1381 (discussing the claim that “the concern mo-
tivating the framers of the eleventh amendment were the Chisholm-type suits brought for 
the collection of debts, not suits against states based on some imagined federal grounds”). 
 151. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of protecting 
all citizens’ constitutional rights). 
 152. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition 
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1060 (1983) (“The eleventh amendment’s fail-
ure to mention in-state citizens suggests that its drafters did not intend it to reach federal 
question suits, for if they intended the amendment to forbid them, their drafting was ex-
traordinarily inept.”). 
 153. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“If this text were intended as a comprehensive description of 
state sovereign immunity in federal courts . . . then it would unquestionably be most rea-
sonable to interpret it as providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdic-
tion is the diversity of citizenship that it describes . . . .”), overruled by  Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
 154. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 50 (“Instead, the Eleventh Amendment can be st be 
interpreted to mean that out-of-staters were deprived of a federal forum only as to those 
cases in which in-staters lacked a federal forum as well.”). 
 155. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that federal courts do not have 
jurisdiction over federal questions involving states and their own citizens); Martha A. 
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 Justice Scalia argues that a robust version of state sovereign im-
munity protections can be justified only if another constitutional 
principle is at work in addition to that which is provided by the Elev-
enth Amendment. Otherwise, “even if the parties to a suit fell within 
its precise terms (for example, a State and the citizen of another 
State) sovereign immunity would not exist so long as one of the 
other, nondiversity grounds of jurisdiction existed.”156 Yet, if one of 
the five members of the Alden majority believes that the best inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment is that it only precludes fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction unless evidence or argument can be offered 
to establish that some other constitutional principle is at work, one 
might expect the Alden opinion to offer impressive evidence and ar-
gument to establish that thesis. One with such an expectation would 
be gravely disappointed. 
 The Alden Court tried to bolster its claim that the Eleventh 
Amendment should not be read merely to preclude federal court di-
versity jurisdiction by stating: “Congress’ refusal to modify the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment to create an exception to sovereign immu-
nity for cases arising under treaties . . . suggests the States’ sover-
eign immunity was understood to extend beyond state-law causes of 
action.”157 Here, the Court was referring to a failed motion158 made by 
Albert Gallatin 159 that the Eleventh Amendment read: “The Judicial 
power of the United States [except in cases arising under treaties 
made under the authority of the United States] shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by 
citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”160 
 A few points should be made about the failure to adopt this modi-
fication to the proposed amendment. First, insofar as the Eleventh 
Amendment was understood merely to bar federal diversity jurisdic-
tion, the amendment would be unnecessary.161 Second, there would 
have been an important reason to reject such a modification, at least 
                                                                                                                  
Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
3, 6 (1997) (“[I]t has been established law for more than a hundred years that the Amend-
ment’s prohibition applies to citizen as well as non-citizen suits.”). 
 156. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. Alden, 527 U.S. at 734. 
 158. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794). 
 159. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1932 (discussing Gallatin and why he proposed the 
amendment). 
 160. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794) (emphasis added). 
 161. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1936 (“The Gallatin proposal . . . was not needed, 
since the eleventh amendment in its final form excluded from federal courts only suits 
against states where jurisdiction was based exclusively on article III’s grant of party-status 
jurisdiction.”). 
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for purposes here, since its adoption would have undercut the diver-
sity interpretation.162 
 Consider the Alden Court’s argument: Since there was a proposal 
to make actions under the treaty subject to federal jurisdiction, it 
must have been understood that without it there would be no such 
jurisdiction. Yet, there is another explanation which supports the op-
posite conclusion. Although Gallatin was not a Federalist, 163 he none-
theless wanted the treaty with Britain enforced because it was a vi-
tal interest of his Western Pennsylvania constituents. 164 By having 
his modification adopted, he might have been able to achieve two 
goals at once: (1) to make the treaty enforceable in federal court, and 
(2) not to make federal laws enforceable in federal court if a state was 
being sued by a citizen of another state. 
 Article III of the Constitution states that the “judicial Power shall 
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority.”165 Suppose that Gallatin’s pro-
posed amendment had been approved and a federal court using the 
rule of interpretation “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”166 had to 
decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear a case involving a state 
and a foreign citizen. That court would hold that it would have juris-
diction if the matter involved a treaty obligation but would not have 
jurisdiction if, for example, the matter involved the laws of the 
United States. By rejecting Gallatin’s amendment, the misperception 
that federal courts would lack jurisdiction over cases with states as 
parties seeking enforcement of federal law could be avoided. Thus, 
Alden analysis notwithstanding, the consideration of the Gallatin 
modification, coupled with the failure to adopt it, speaks as strongly 
in favor of the diversity interpretation as against it. 
D.   On Construing the Eleventh Amendment 
 In United States v. Sprague,167 the Court suggested, “The Consti-
tution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and 
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished 
from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room 
                                                                                                                  
 162. It is impossible to tell whether this was actually one of the reasons, since one of 
the difficulties in interpreting the Eleventh Amendment is that while there are records of 
proposed amendments to it there are no accompanying records of why those amendments 
were rejected. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794). 
 163. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1932. 
 164. See id. at 1933. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 166. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990) (“The inclusion of one is the exclusion 
of another.”). 
 167. 282 U.S. 716 (1931). 
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for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”168 The 
question at hand is how that rule of interpretation should be used 
when analyzing the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 
 One confusing issue is why the Eleventh Amendment states that 
the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to certain cases 
rather than stating quite simply that the judicial power shall not ex-
tend to those cases. One plain reading of the Amendment would be 
that the extant Constitution should no longer be so construed,169 es-
pecially given that the Chisholm opinion had just been issued and 
the Court had construed the Constitution to grant the federal courts 
jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit. 170 That is, following the line 
of argument offered in Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, the Consti-
tution should not be construed to authorize the federal courts to hear 
such cases because an act of Congress would also be required for the 
federal courts to exercise that jurisdiction. 
 If the desire had been to preclude the federal courts from hearing 
cases between states and foreign citizens even when federal ques-
tions were at issue, then the Amendment should have stated either 
that the judicial power simply would not extend to those cases (and 
not merely that the judicial power should not be “construed” to ex-
tend to those cases) or, perhaps, that Congress was not authorized171 
to grant the federal courts jurisdiction to hear those cases. 172 If in-
deed there was a general understanding at the time that federal 
courts could hear federal issues, and that states were subject to suit 
                                                                                                                  
 168. Id. at 731 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)). 
 169. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1339. Pfander states: 
By the time Congress reconvened in January 1794, eight states had expressed 
support for the adoption of a constitutional amendment, and had done so in 
terms that suggested the need to remove or explain any provision of the Consti-
tution that could ‘be construed’ to make states subject to suits by individuals. 
Id.  
 170. See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696. Vazquez explains: 
[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not give constitutional status to the states’ 
sovereign immunity; it merely reversed Chisholm’s holding that the Constitu-
tion itself did away with this immunity [and] . . . state sovereign immunity re-
mains as a common law immunity . . . that, as such, . . . is subject to plenary 
abrogation by Congress. 
Id. 
 171. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he testimony of five emi-
nent legal minds of the day confirmed that virtually everyone who understood immunity to 
be legitimate saw it as a common-law prerogative (from which it follows that it was subject 
to abrogation by Congress as to a matter within Congress’s Article I authority).”); Vazquez, 
supra note 8, at 1696 (discussing the view that “state sovereign immunity remains as a 
common law immunity, but they maintain that, as such, it is subject to plenary abrogation 
by Congress”). 
 172. But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“It did not in terms prohibit suits 
by individuals against the States, but declared that the Constitution should not be con-
strued to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.”) (emphasis added). 
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in federal court if federal questions were implicated,173 then the most 
sensible reading of the text of the Amendment is that the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts should not be construed beyond what it was al-
ready understood to be.174 
 When discussing the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Cohens 
v. Virginia recognized that a state has an interest in having “the full 
power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or 
of other claims upon it.”175 However, the Court pointed out that the 
state does not have an interest “in so changing the relations between 
the whole and its parts, as to strip the government of the means of 
protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and 
laws from active violation.”176 Precisely because states are members 
of a union, they cannot be permitted to thwart with impunity either 
federal law or the rights of citizens granted under the federal Consti-
tution. Thus, the Cohens Court suggested that Chisholm was 
wrongly decided but that the Constitution, even with the Eleventh 
Amendment, does not preclude the federal courts from having juris-
diction if federal questions are at issue, even if a state is one of the 
parties. 177 
 In Alden, the Court suggested that the “Constitution was under-
stood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States’ tra-
ditional immunity from private suits.”178 Of course, this traditional 
immunity was from private suits under state law and such an under-
standing would not speak to what would happen were Congress to 
have entered the picture. Indeed, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent 
emphasized this very point.179 In any event, given all of the interpre-
tations floating around at the time and the express claims made by 
many of those debating ratification that states would be subject to 
suit involving federal law, the failure of the Eleventh Amendment to 
read any differently counsels against the interpretation offered by 
the Alden Court of the original understanding of sovereign immu-
nity. 
                                                                                                                  
 173. See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1350 (“[T]he majority of those who commented on 
the issue concluded that the Constitution did subject states to suits in federal courts.”). 
 174. See John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1147, 1148 (2000) (“By far the most attention . . . has been paid to the words ‘shall not be 
construed.’ This phrase is often taken to indicate that the Amendment was not intended to 
change the meaning of the Constitution, but only to instruct the Court as to its correct 
reading.”). 
 175. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 407 (1821). 
 176. Id; see also Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1951 (“[E]ven antinationalist state court 
judges did not regard the amendment as a confirmation of state sovereign immunity.”). 
 177. See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text. 
 178. Alden, 527 U.S. at 724. 
 179. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
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 The Cohens Court analyzed the effect of the Eleventh Amendment 
on federal jurisdiction,180 recognizing that the “States are constituent 
parts of the United States . . . [and are] for some purposes sovereign, 
for some purposes subordinate.”181 Yet, if the states are sovereign for 
some purposes and subordinate for others, and if the states can nei-
ther have laws nor constitutions that are repugnant to federal law,182 
then there must be a judiciary to “give efficacy to the constitutional 
laws of the legislature” and to “decide on the validity of the constitu-
tion or law of a State, if it be repugnant to the constitution or to a 
law of the United States.”183 Since the “exercise of the appellate 
power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may con-
travene the constitution or laws of the United States, is . . . essential 
to the attainment of those objects [which are of vital interest to the 
nation],”184 the Court suggested that the Constitution, even with the 
Eleventh Amendment, must be construed to “give to the Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitu-
tion, laws, and treaties of the United States.”185 
 In Cohens, the Court explained the rationale behind allowing the 
federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction, that is, “jurisdiction 
[which] depends on the character of the parties.”186 Because the 
“State tribunals might be suspected of partiality in cases between it-
self or its citizens and aliens, or the citizens of another State, but not 
in proceedings by a State against its own citizens,”187 it makes sense 
to allow a federal court to have jurisdiction in the former case but not 
in the latter. However, that argument was “not entitled to the same 
force when urged to prove that this Court cannot inquire whether the 
constitution or laws of the United States protect a citizen from a 
prosecution instituted against him by a State.”188 The Court ex-
plained that granting jurisdiction to the federal courts was not 
merely intended to circumvent the possible “partiality of the State 
tribunals.”189 Rather, a more important reason “was the preservation 
of the constitution and laws of the United States, so far as they can 
be preserved by judicial authority; and therefore the jurisdiction of 
the Courts of the Union was expressly extended to all cases arising 
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 181. Id. at 414. 
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under that constitution and those laws.”190 He asked rhetorically, “If 
the constitution or laws may be violated by proceedings instituted by 
a State against its own citizens, . . . why should these cases be ex-
cepted from that provision which expressly extends the judicial 
power of the Union to all cases arising under the constitution and 
laws?”191 
 The Cohens Court’s analysis is important to consider. It helps ex-
plain why the Chisholm Court believed it important that a suit be-
tween a state and a citizen of another state be heard in federal 
court—so that the partiality of state tribunals might be avoided. It 
also makes clear that one of the most important functions of the fed-
eral courts is to protect the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States. Thus, a reason that might justify removing diversity jurisdic-
tion from the federal courts over certain kinds of cases might not suf-
fice to justify removing federal question jurisdiction over those same 
kinds of cases. 
 The Alden Court suggested as follows:  
The Court has been consistent in interpreting the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment as conclusive evidence “that the decision in 
Chisholm  was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the 
Constitution,” and that the views expressed by Hamilton, Madison, 
and Marshall during the ratification debates, and by Justice Ire-
dell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm, reflect the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution.192 
What is most confusing about this analysis is that it does not lead to 
the robust interpretation of state sovereign immunity offered by the 
Alden Court. 
 Suppose that Justice Iredell had convinced his Chisholm col-
leagues that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear that case due 
to the lack of congressional authorization.193 Suppose further that the 
Eleventh Amendment had never been adopted. It seems most 
unlikely that the Court’s current state sovereign immunity position 
would have been adopted, at least if the idea was to reflect the inten-
tions of the Framers, 194 even though this is exactly what the current 
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Court says would have happened.195 To see why this is implausible, it 
will be important to examine the Framers’ intent. 
IV.   THE INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS 
 When discussing sovereign immunity, the Alden Court relied on 
its understanding of the Framers’ view of sovereign immunity. While 
admitting that some members of the founding generation had a dif-
ferent view,196 the Court was confident that its position was shared 
by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, at least as their views were re-
flected in the ratification debates. 197 Yet, there are reasons to doubt 
that these individuals in particular or that the Framers in general 
shared the Court’s view. 
A.   John Marshall 
 It might seem surprising to suggest that John Marshall sub-
scribed to the robust view of sovereign immunity currently articu-
lated by the Court. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Cohens v. 
Virginia, in which the Court made clear that the Eleventh Amend-
ment merely precluded the federal courts from having diversity ju-
risdiction when a state was a party, and thus on its face the Alden 
Court’s attribution to him of its own position is counter-intuitive. 
 In Cohens, Justice Marshall writing for the Court considered the 
“general proposition, that a sovereign independent State is not su-
able, except by its own consent.”198 While admitting that this “general 
proposition will not be controverted,” he pointed out that “consent is 
not requisite in each particular case.”199 Instead consent “may be 
given in a general law.”200 For example, consent may be given by 
agreeing to become part of the Union. 
 To determine whether states had consented to suit by ratifying 
the Constitution, Justice Marshall suggested that an examination of 
“the instrument by which the surrender is made” would be re-
quired.201 Because the American states and people had been taught 
                                                                                                                  
Congress exercising its conceded Article I power may unquestionably abrogate such immu-
nity.”). 
 195. See Field, supra note 155, at 5-6. Field explains: 
One oddity of this interpretational approach is that the Court is essentially 
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 196. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 725. 
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 198. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 380 (1821). 
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by experience that the “government would be a mere shadow . . . 
unless invested with large portions of that sovereignty which belongs 
to independent States,” the “American people, in the conventions of 
their respective States, adopted the present constitution.”202 Thus, 
Justice Marshall explained, the Framers had written the Constitu-
tion while cognizant of the need for the federal government to be 
ceded large portions of the states’ sovereignty and, by virtue of be-
coming members of the Union under that constitution, the states had 
surrendered much of their sovereignty.203 
 That surrender of sovereignty might have been limited to issues of 
federal concern or might, in addition, have involved a general sur-
render of sovereign immunity in cases involving foreign citizens. Jus-
tice Marshall focused on the former, pointing out that the “general 
government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect 
to those objects,”204 and that the “ample powers confided to this su-
preme government . . . are connected many express and important 
limitations on the sovereignty of the States.”205 Thus, Justice Mar-
shall in Cohens suggests that Chisholm was wrongly decided in that 
states have the power of deciding how to adjust their debts, 206 but 
that federal courts would have jurisdiction over a case involving a 
state and a foreign citizen were a federal question implicated.207 
 Justice Marshall considered whether “the nature of our constitu-
tion; the subordination of the State governments to that constitution; 
[and] the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases arising 
under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided to 
the judicial department”208 would nonetheless permit a jurisdictional 
“exception of those cases in which a State may be a party.”209 He sug-
gested that the “spirit of the constitution” would not permit such an 
exception, and that “a case arising under the constitution or laws of 
the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever 
may be the parties to that case.”210 Thus, Justice Marshall made very 
clear that he would not subscribe to the analysis of sovereign immu-
nity later offered by the Alden Court. 
 Lest one misunderstand his view, Justice Marshall considered the 
implications of a ruling to the contrary.211 Specifically, he considered 
a case holding as follows: notwithstanding that the “constitution gave 
                                                                                                                  
 202. Id. at 380-81. 
 203. See id. 
 204. Id. at 381. 
 205. Id. at 382. 
 206. See id. at 407. 
 207. See infra text accompanying notes 208-215. 
 208. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 382. 
 209. Id. at 382-83. 
 210. Id. at 383. 
 211. See id. at 383-84. 
636  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:605 
 
to every person having a [federal] claim upon a State, a right to sub-
mit his case to the Court of the nation,”212 the Court nonetheless 
could not hear the case “because the State is a party.”213 He believed 
such a holding would have “mischievous consequences,” and that 
these consequences could not be countenanced, since such a holding 
“would prostrate . . . the government and its laws at the feet of every 
State in the Union.”214 Thus, Justice Marshall made clear that “as the 
constitution originally stood, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, 
in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States, was not arrested by the circumstance that a State was 
a party.”215 
 In Cohens, Justice Marshall argued that states had surrendered 
much of their sovereignty under the original Constitution.216 This is 
directly contrary to the Alden Court’s claims about Justice Marshall’s 
position. However, it might be argued, Justice Marshall wrote the 
majority position in Cohens years after the Constitution had been 
adopted, and it would be more accurate to consult what he said at the 
time of its adoption to ascertain his view or, perhaps, the views of 
those voting for ratification. Indeed, Marshall’s argument in the rati-
fication debates is cited as establishing that states would not be sub-
ject to suit in federal court, since he suggested that “[i]t is not ra-
tional to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before 
a court.”217 Yet, that statement may be misleading unless considera-
tion is given to the context in which it was made. 
 The Alden Court quoted much of the following passage,218 but did 
not closely analyze it. During the ratification debates, Marshall ad-
dressed the issue of suits between states and citizens of other states 
in the following way: 
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another 
state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I 
hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the 
bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there 
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not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and 
yet the State is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the sov-
ereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to 
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other 
states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, 
say they, there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defen-
dant—if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a 
state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so, 
and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defen-
dant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only 
what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on that account? 
If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it 
to be presumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not 
obtain satisfaction? But how could a state recover any claim from a 
citizen of another state, without the establishment of these tribu-
nals?219 
 Marshall claimed that the intent of Article III was “to enable 
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.”220 In 
response to the argument that it would be unfair “if an individual 
cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be 
sued by a state,”221 Marshall said: “It is necessary to be so, and can-
not be avoided.”222  
 Marshall’s response is surprising. One might wonder why “it” was 
necessarily so, since the discussion assumed the possibility of two dif-
ferent positions (the state’s being suable or the state’s not being su-
able) and the question at hand was which possibility it would be. If 
indeed one or the other position was necessarily so, more argument 
was required. 
 What has been underappreciated in the primary and secondary 
literature discussing Marshall’s response is that it is ambiguous. 
More analysis is required to discern what he was saying. Given the 
charge that it is unfair to allow states to sue but not be sued, Mar-
shall might be claiming either of the following: (1) because it would 
be unfair for a state to be able to sue but not be sued, it is necessarily 
so that states are also suable, or (2) even though it is unfair that 
states can sue but not be sued, that unfairness is acceptable because 
it would promote the greater good. 
 Marshall’s next sentence is even more confusing. He suggests that 
he sees a difficulty in making a state a defendant but not a plaintiff, 
which at least on its face is a non sequitur because the issue at hand 
is whether a state can be made a plaintiff but not a defendant. There 
are at least two ways to explain his response. The first is either that 
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he misspoke or that his comments were transcribed incorrectly and 
he really said or meant to say that he perceived difficulty in making 
a state a plaintiff but not a defendant. The second explanation, which 
is a little more complicated, is that the reporting is accurate, but that 
he had not yet finished making his argument. 
 Marshall argues that it should be presumed that an individual 
who has a just claim against a legislature will in fact receive satisfac-
tion. Thus, that individual would have no need to go to court, and it 
would not matter whether the state is suable. “If an individual has a 
just claim against any particular state, is it to be presumed that, on 
application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction?”223 How-
ever, there is no presumption that the state will be compensated as 
long as its claim is just; thus, the state may need to go to court to 
press its suit against an individual. Marshall asked, “[H]ow could a 
state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, without the 
establishment of these tribunals?”224 Thus, a state’s suability and its 
ability to sue will be to the state’s advantage because those who 
would win a judgment against the state would be paid by the legisla-
ture anyway, while the state will only be able to receive the monies it 
is owed if it can avail itself of the courts. 
 Marshall may have been dissembling when suggesting that it 
would be irrational to suppose that the sovereign would be dragged 
into court because, allegedly, the sovereign would always do the right 
thing.225 However, his appeal to the difficulty in making a state a de-
fendant but not a plaintiff, while turning the question at hand on its 
head, nonetheless suggests that Marshall saw the very fairness prob-
lem which Chief Justice Jay discussed in Chisholm.226  
 Marshall did not specify the difficulty he saw in making a state a 
defendant and not a plaintiff, although he implied that it was that 
the state would thereby lose financially. If that was the perceived dif-
ficulty, then an analysis is required of four possibilities: (1) the state 
could be a plaintiff but not a defendant, (2) the state could be a de-
fendant but not a plaintiff, (3) the state could be both a plaintiff and 
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a defendant, and (4) the state could be neither a plaintiff nor a de-
fendant. If the legislature would authorize the payment of all of its 
just debts anyway and, presumably, the courts would not require 
anything contrary to justice,227 then the state would be a potential 
loser in (2) and (4). Insofar as he was addressing the only apparently 
financially advantageous position (1), Marshall implicitly was sug-
gesting (a) that it would not in fact be financially preferable because 
the state would make the same payments whether or not potentially 
sued, and (b) there are other costs attached to permitting the state to 
sue but not be sued, for example, perceived unfairness. If he was not 
in addition arguing (b), then there would be no reason not to adopt 
(1), since there would be no costs to its adoption. Thus, if he were 
suggesting that the state should both be able to sue and be sued,228 
then he seems to have been taking unfairness concerns seriously. 
Otherwise, the answer to the question concerning the partiality of 
making states plaintiffs but not defendants would have been “Yes, 
but so what?,” with no further discussion about either the presump-
tion that legislatures would pay their debts or the implication that 
states would be losers unless able both to sue and be sued. 
 A further point about Marshall’s discussion is in order. When 
commenting about the unfairness of allowing individuals to be sued 
but not to sue, he made it quite clear that he was addressing the is-
sue of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. Where the abridg-
ment of a constitutional right was at issue, he stated that the federal 
judiciary should have jurisdiction. Marshall asked rhetorically: “To 
what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the 
Constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary?”229 Fur-
ther, he had already made quite clear that he was talking about the 
federal judiciary, since he had just been talking about the federal 
courts. Moments before, he had asked rhetorically: “Is it not neces-
sary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases arising 
under the Constitution, and the laws, of the United States? . . . 
[W]here can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here?”230 
 It is debatable what Marshall was saying when addressing the 
unfairness of allowing states to sue but not be sued on nonfederal 
questions. However, at least two points must be made: (1) interpret-
ing him to be saying that those who can sue must also be suable 
makes better sense of the entire discussion, and (2) in any event, that 
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discussion involved a state debt which would be in federal court on 
diversity grounds. Marshall clearly stated that it was necessary for 
federal questions to be heard in federal court, even if a state was a 
party, Alden ’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding. 
B.   James Madison 
 Marshall’s response was characterized by the Alden Court as pro-
viding support for Madison’s robust state sovereignty view.231 Yet, 
Madison’s views in the ratification debates were not as supportive of 
state sovereignty as the Alden Court implied.232 For example, the 
Court pointed to Madison’s response to the suggestion that the fed-
eral judicial power extended to controversies between a State and 
Citizens of another State, namely, that the Supreme Court’s “juris-
diction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state 
is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the 
power of individuals to call any state into court.”233 
 Certainly, it might be thought that this supports a robust state 
sovereignty view. Yet, here, Madison was discussing federal diversity 
jurisdiction.234 Furthermore, the Court neglected to mention that in 
the same address Madison had distinguished between a federal di-
versity case and a different kind of case that could come up in federal 
court. Precisely because it was not even an issue as to whether the 
latter could be heard, he spent relatively little time discussing it. 
That causes of a federal nature will arise, will be obvious to every 
gentleman who will recollect that the states are laid under restric-
tions, and that the rights of the Union are secured by these restric-
tions. They may involve equitable as well as legal controversies. 
With respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary and expe-
dient that the judicial power should correspond with the legisla-
tive, that it has not been objected to.235 
 Madison suggested that with respect to federal laws it was so nec-
essary for the judicial and legislative power to correspond, that is, 
that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges involving 
federal laws, that no one was even questioning it. Thus, insofar as 
one only looks at the ratification debates, Madison’s comments sug-
gest both that Chisholm was wrongly decided and that federal courts 
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should be hearing cases involving federal questions even if states 
were parties.  
 Madison offered a similar view in the Federalist Papers. He ar-
gued that certain matters were appropriately left to the federal gov-
ernment and that certain matters should be left to the states. Thus, 
the national “jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, 
and leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty over all other subjects.”236 Here, Madison was suggesting that 
the federal courts should have jurisdiction over matters of federal 
concern. 
 Of course, there would be some question as to whether a particu-
lar matter was of national rather than state concern. Madison sug-
gested that “in controversies relating to the boundary between the 
two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be 
established under the general government.”237 Thus, not only did 
Madison believe that the federal courts should have jurisdiction over 
cases involving federal questions even if states were involved, but he 
argued that federal courts would have to decide whether federal is-
sues were implicated in particular cases. 
 Madison, among others, recognized that “a right implies a rem-
edy,”238 and allowing states a robust sovereign immunity would un-
dermine the connection between rights and remedies.239 Indeed, 
Madison believed that it was very important that a variety of provi-
sions of the federal constitution be enforced. “Bills of attainder, ex 
post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, are 
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every 
principle of sound legislation.”240 He suggested that it was therefore 
quite good that the “convention added this constitutional bulwark in 
favour of personal security and private rights.”241 Yet, one must won-
der about the extent to which personal security and private rights 
would have advanced if states would have been immune after violat-
ing these first principles of the social compact. 
 If Madison were confident that the states would never violate 
these rights, then perhaps there would be no need to have the federal 
courts available to enforce them. However, Madison believed that the 
states might attempt to violate these principles, suggesting that the 
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“sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which 
has directed the public councils.”242 Indeed, Madison suggested that 
Americans “have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden 
changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal 
rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential 
speculators; and snares to the more industrious and less informed 
part of the community.”243 Thus, states might violate the very impor-
tant rights that had been safeguarded by the Constitution. If the fed-
eral courts were not to have jurisdiction over state violations of fed-
eral guarantees, there would be a right without a remedy. 
 While Madison might have believed that nonconsenting states 
could not be dragged into federal court for failing to honor contract 
provisions, he certainly believed that they could be brought into fed-
eral court for violations of federal law or constitutional guarantees. 
Whether one examines his comments during the ratification debates 
or his writings in the Federalist Papers, one sees that Madison was 
not the staunch states sovereignty advocate that the Alden Court 
makes him out to be. 
C.   Alexander Hamilton 
 Of the three, Alexander Hamilton seems to be the clearest exam-
ple of a Framer who had a robust state sovereignty position. The 
Alden Court quoted Hamilton saying that “[i]t is inherent in the na-
ture of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent,”244 and in his dissent Justice Souter seemed to 
admit that Hamilton provided support for the Court’s “absolutist 
view,” although Justice Souter also cautioned that “Hamilton chose 
his words carefully.”245 
 Yet, even Hamilton’s views, properly understood, are no more 
compatible with the Court’s than are the views of Marshall or Madi-
son.246 Hamilton responded to the suggestion that “an assignment of 
the public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would en-
able them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for the amount 
of those securities”247 by pointing out, “It is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without 
its consent.”248 However, lest one misunderstand his point, Hamilton 
                                                                                                                  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 416-17 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987)). 
 245. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 246. Justice Souter seemed to sense this when he noted Hamilton’s acknowledgement, 
the “States might have surrendered sovereign immunity in some circumstances.” See id. 
(Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice Souter did not explore the point. 
 247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
 248. Id. at 416-17. 
2001]  CONFEDERATION PRINCIPLES 643 
 
wrote in the same paragraph, “Unless, therefor, there is a surrender 
of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with 
the states.”249 
 The question then becomes whether there is a surrender of that 
immunity in the plan of the Convention. Hamilton argued that “there 
is no colour to pretend that the state governments would, by the 
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own 
debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which 
flows from the obligations of good faith.”250 He further argued that it 
would be unwise to authorize suits against the states to force them to 
pay their debts. “To what purpose would it be to authorize suits 
against states for the debts that they owe?”251 
 Nonetheless, Hamilton clearly believed that by becoming part of 
the Union states would surrender some of their sovereignty. The only 
question was the specification of the “circumstances which are neces-
sary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty.”252 Hamilton sug-
gested that “the state governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act, 
exclusively delegated to the United States.”253 He then proceeded to 
discuss the three cases in which this delegation or alienation of state 
sovereignty would occur: 
                                                                                                                  
 249. Id. at 417; see also Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The 
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . was modified pro tanto in 1788 to the ex-
tent that the States relinquished their sovereignty to the Federal Government. At the time 
our Union was formed, the States, for the good of the whole, gave certain powers to Con-
gress . . . .”); Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1068-69 (“[A]fter 1788, much of their sovereignty 
was given up or, perhaps more accurately, was revoked and conferred upon another sover-
eign. The precise character of the state sovereignty that remained was not, and probably 
could not have been, made clear when the Constitution was adopted.”); Jackson, supra note 
8, at 81-82 (discussing Hamilton’s comments); Nowak, supra note 6, at 1429 (“In Federalist 
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damage suits against state governments; he did not maintain that Article III also denied 
Congress the right to grant federal court jurisdiction over suits against states.”); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separa-
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(1976) (discussing the original understanding that states surrendered sovereign immunity 
only to the extent that doing so was inherent in accepting the constitutional plan). 
 250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987); see 
also John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Su-
preme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2000) (“All of the reasons [Hamilton] e x-
presses in Federalist No. 81 for arguing against inherent jurisdiction over debt cases 
against state governments would not apply to the issue of whether Congress could create a 
regulation enforceable against state governments through court actions.”). 
 251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
 252. Id. However, he discussed the circumstances in which states relinquished sover-
eignty in his article on taxation and chose not to repeat them in Federalist 81.  
 253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 151-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
However, this would not entitle states to violate federal protections with impunity. See in-
fra notes 258-64 and accompanying text. 
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where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive au-
thority to the union; where it granted an authority to the union 
and prohibited the states from exercising the like authority; and 
where it granted an authority to the union, to which a similar au-
thority in the state would be absolutely and totally contradictory 
and repugnant.254 
 To illustrate his meaning, Hamilton discussed the “clause which 
declares, that congress shall have power to ‘establish an UNIFORM 
RULE of naturalization throughout the United States.’ This must 
necessarily be exclusive; because if each state had power to prescribe 
a DISTINCT RULE, there could be no UNIFORM RULE.”255 Thus, 
where there was supposed to be one rule, states would neither be al-
lowed to legislate nor to circumvent the federal rule because that 
would undermine the uniformity which the Constitution had sought 
to achieve when Congress was given this power exclusively. 
 Hamilton’s claim is important to consider. Under his view, states 
have given up all sovereignty claims with respect to any of the Arti-
cle I powers that have been exclusively given to Congress. Consider 
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”256 Hamilton 
would suggest that the state would not have sovereign immunity 
with respect to issues implicating this power, Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida’s257 implications to the contrary notwithstanding,258 because Con-
gress alone would have been given the power to regulate these areas 
and states would undermine that authority if they could plead sover-
eign immunity after having contravened Congress’s will. 
 Hamilton made very clear that he recognized the need for en-
forcement of federal law against the states. 259 He said quite specifi-
cally that the “states, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited 
from doing a variety of things,” and further suggested that no person 
“of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously 
regarded, without some effectual power in the government to re-
                                                                                                                  
 254. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
 255. Id.  
 256. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 257. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 258. See id. at 47 (“We hold that notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent to abrogate 
the States’ sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that 
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 259. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) 
(“There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the states, of the regulations of 
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strain or correct the infractions of them.”260 Thus, Hamilton, like 
Madison, recognized that states would violate federal law unless 
some system of effective enforcement were in place. 
 Hamilton discussed two different ways in which such an enforce-
ment system might be structured. “This power must either be a di-
rect negative on the state laws, or an authority in the federal courts, 
to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the arti-
cles of union.”261 He then explained that the latter was “thought by 
the convention preferable to the former.”262 Thus, according to Hamil-
ton, who allegedly was a robust state sovereignty theorist and advo-
cate, a state violating federal law would be amenable to suit in the 
federal courts, even if the aggrieved party was a citizen of a foreign 
state who had, for example, wrongly been subjected to a tariff on her 
goods.263 
 Each of the theorists cited by Alden as having a robust state sov-
ereignty view seemed at most264 to believe that while nonconsenting 
states would not be subject to suit in federal court if state law were 
at issue, they would be subject to a federal court’s jurisdiction if a 
federal law were at issue. When one further considers that one of the 
members of the Chisholm majority was also one of the writers of the 
Federalist Papers and that two others in the majority participated in 
the Constitutional Convention,265 it does not seem plausible to believe 
that the Framers held the view of state sovereign immunity that has 
been ascribed to them by the Court.266 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Chisholm was a very unpopular decision that eventually led to the 
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. However, Chisholm did not 
involve federal question jurisdiction, and the shock that the decision 
caused cannot be inferred to have involved it, especially since even 
                                                                                                                  
 260. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 28-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987) 
(discussing tariffs and duties that might be imposed by a state to protect its own citizens). 
 264. It is unclear how to characterize Marshall, at least from his comments in the rati-
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the Chisholm dissent did consider that to be the weakness in the ma-
jority’s decision. 
 The Eleventh Amendment suggests that the Court should no 
longer construe the Constitution as it had in Chisholm. In other 
words, the Court should not read the Constitution to grant diversity 
jurisdiction to the federal courts where a state and foreign citizen are 
parties and only matters of state law are at issue. The Amendment 
was not intended, however, to remove federal court jurisdiction when 
federal questions were implicated, even if a state was one of the par-
ties. 
 In Ableman v. Booth,267 the Court pointed out that “it was felt by 
the statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the people who 
adopted it, that it was necessary that many of the rights of sover-
eignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the Gen-
eral Government.”268 Not only was this sovereignty surrendered, but 
those setting up the Union believed that the federal government 
must be “strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, 
without interruption from a State or from State authorities.”269 If 
federal courts were not empowered to hear cases involving federal 
law, then “the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United 
States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would 
soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the 
Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one 
State and another thing in another.”270 The Court noted that it was 
essential to the Federal Government’s very existence that “it should 
have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independ-
ent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws.”271 
 The need for one effective federal law could not be satisfied if 
states were able to avoid suits in federal court by pleading sovereign 
immunity. As the Framers realized, there would be, at most, a con-
federation of states rather than one Union, if large portions of state 
sovereign immunity had not been surrendered when states ratified 
the Constitution; a confederation was exactly what the Framers 
sought to replace when arguing for the ratification of the Constitu-
tion. 
 The current sovereign immunity interpretation offered by the 
Court does not represent the intentions of the Framers, claims to the 
contrary notwithstanding. It may well be that at least some of the 
Framers did not believe that nonconsenting states should be subject 
to federal court jurisdiction on diversity grounds; however, a re-
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quirement that states must always give permission to be sued by a 
foreign citizen in federal court would have been too close to the bad 
experience under the Articles of Confederation ever to have been ac-
ceptable 
 In discussing the defects of the Articles of Confederation, Alexan-
der Hamilton suggested that “[t]he fundamental defect is a want of 
power in Congress.”272 He cautioned against permitting “an uncontro-
lable sovereignty in each state . . . [which would] defeat the other 
powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precari-
ous.”273 Hamilton understood that there would be “instances without 
number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise 
out of the powers given to Congress”274 would nonetheless be resisted 
by the states, and that there would be many instances in which 
states could “effectually though indirectly counteract the arrange-
ments of Congress.”275 Unless the federal courts had jurisdiction to 
hear cases in which the states were thwarting federal laws or, per-
haps, were abridging the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution, the plan of the Convention would effectively be sub-
verted. 
 James Madison discussed one of the difficulties of the Confedera-
tion, namely, a “want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the 
Government of the Confederacy.”276 He suggested, “A sanction is es-
sential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Governmment. The 
federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital princi-
ples of a Political Cons[ti]tution.”277 He tried to figure out from “what 
cause so fatal an omission have happened in the articles of Confed-
eration,”278 and suggested that it was “from a mistaken confidence 
that the justice, the good faith, the honor, the sound policy, of the 
several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal 
to the ordinary motives by which the laws secure the obedience of in-
dividuals.”279 He thus made clear his belief that the states would also 
have to be subject to the courts and to the coercion that might be im-
posed there if the Constitution and the federal laws were to be the 
“supreme Law of the land.”280 He, like others, had learned from pre-
vious experience under the Articles of Confederation that states 
                                                                                                                  
 272. 1 THE FOUNDERS’  CONSTITUTION 150 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987) (Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780). 
 273. Id. at 151. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 167 (James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, Apr. 
1787). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 167-68. 
 280. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
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would likely be tempted to undermine federal law and that the fed-
eral courts would have to decide when states were overstepping their 
bounds.281 
 John Marshall argued that federal courts would have to have ju-
risdiction over issues involving the Constitution and federal laws. He 
suggested this both in Cohens and also in the ratification debates. 282 
He, like the other Framers, understood that the consequences of al-
lowing states to plead sovereign immunity when violating federal law 
or abridging individual rights under the Constitution would be too 
“mischievous”283 to be tolerated. 
 The current Court claims to base its robust state sovereign immu-
nity view on the intentions of the Framers. Yet, the Framers had just 
experienced the consequences of having a weak central government 
where states might put their own perceived interests over the inter-
ests of the nation as a whole. The Framers understood what the 
Court apparently does not: unless states can be forced to appear in 
federal court, they will violate federal law and subvert national in-
terests with impunity, whether directly or indirectly.284 The Court’s 
current interpretation of state sovereign immunity does not comport 
with the language of the Constitution, the Framers’ intentions, or a 
policy likely to promote the interests of the nation as a whole, and 
must be corrected at the first opportunity. 
 
                                                                                                                  
 281. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
 282. See supra notes 198-230 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra text accompanying note 214. 
 284. While this is mitigated because of the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), that doctrine will not do the trick entirely, as Seminole Tribe suggests, see Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (holding that Young did not allow the instant suit to be brought 
against a state official), because the Court’s current rationale would support restricting 
Young protections. If indeed a state sovereignty is as robust as the current Court suggests, 
the Young exception, which permits suit against state officials for injunctive relief even 
without the state’s consent, would seem difficult to justify. 
